Layout 1 by Noam Chomsky

Author:Noam Chomsky [Chomsky, Noam]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Published: 2015-02-23T21:41:02+00:00

Rethinking Camelot text pages 6_Layout 1 2/23/15 3:41 PM Page 131

2

Interpretations

We have reviewed the first three categories of evidence concerning Kennedy’s war and plans, and the presidential transition: the events themselves, public statements, and the internal record.

The last source of evidence is the memoirs and other comments of his associates. These come in two versions: before and after the Tet Offensive. We review these in the next two sections, then turning to the 1991-1992 revival. This survey only adds conviction to what we have already found, while shedding interesting light on the cultural scene.

1. The Early Version

Kennedy’s commitment to stay the course was clear to those closest to him. As noted, Arthur Schlesinger shared JFK’s perception of the enormous stakes and his optimism that the military escalation had reversed the “aggression” of the indigenous guerrillas in 1962. There is not a word in Schlesinger’s chronicle of the Kennedy years that hints of any intention, however vague, to withdraw without victory (1965, reprinted 1967).

In fact, Schlesinger gives no indication that JFK thought about withdrawal at all. The withdrawal plans receive one sentence in his voluminous text. In the context of the debate over pressuring the Diem regime, Schlesinger writes that McNamara returned from Saigon in October 1963 and 131

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“announced...that a thousand American troops could be withdrawn by the end of the year and that the major part of the American military task would be completed by the end of 1965.” That is the entire discussion of withdrawal plans in this 940-page virtual day-by-day record of the Kennedy Administration by its quasi-official historian.1

These facts leave only three possible conclusions: (1) the historian was keeping the President’s intentions secret; (2) this close JFK confidant had no inkling of his intentions; (3) there were no such intentions.

Which is it? The question is addressed only obliquely by advocates of the withdrawal-without-victory thesis. The only plausible conclusion is (3), but that is rejected by the advocates, leaving (1) or (2). The latter might strain credulity, unless taken to show the lengths to which JFK went to deceive all around him.

Newman cites Schlesinger’s justification in 1978 of JFK’s “decision to hide his plans” (324), implying that the correct conclusion is (1)—unless Schlesinger had learned about these “secret plans”

in the interim, which no one claims, including Schlesinger himself. Hence Schlesinger too must be adopting (1). Furthermore, he lauds Newman’s book with no relevant reservations, again suggesting that he regards (1) as accurate. One would be interested to hear an explanation.

Similar questions arise in the case of another close associate, Theodore Sorenson, who also published a history of the Administration in 1965. Sorenson was Kennedy’s first appointed official, served as his special counsel, and attended all NSC

meetings. He stayed on through the early months of the Johnson Administration. He devotes little attention to Vietnam. No withdrawal plans are mentioned. Quite the contrary. Kennedy’s

“essential contribution” was to avoid the extremes advocated “by those impatient to win or withdraw. His

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